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LOWERING THE BAR AND RAISING
EXPECTATIONS: RECENT COURT DECISIONS
IN LIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION
William Douglas Woody *
In January 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court decided People v. LaRosa,
which provided greater flexibility to corroborate confessions by overturning
the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard.1 The recent 10th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sanchez v. Hartley raises a separate
yet related concern: qualified immunity no longer protects law enforcement
officers who fail to corroborate confessions thoroughly. In Sanchez, a failure to
fit Sanchez’s confession cleanly to the existing evidence led the court to conclude
that police either knew the suspect’s confession was false or recklessly disregarded
this possibility.2 This decision raised the bar to corroborate a confession,
particularly for police, who must evaluate the truth or falsity of confessions
and seek corroboration during an investigation without the benefit of hindsight.
This article applies scientific scholarship about interrogation and confession
to these decisions, one of which lowers the legal standard for corroboration to
admit a disputed confession to trial and one of which raises expectations for
corroboration for police officers. Legal decision rules, human thinking biases,
* William Douglas Woody, Ph.D. is Professor of Psychological Sciences at the University of
Northern Colorado. He thanks his colleague Steven Pulos, Ph.D., J.D. for connecting him to Evig’s
article and for encouragement and feedback through the process. He also thanks current and former
students Karlee R. Provenza, M.S., Skye A. Woestehoff, Ph.D., Benjamin J. Williams, B.A., Rachel
B. Best, B.A., Blake Karlin, B.A., and Czarina Grogan for helpful feedback on various drafts.
1
People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567 (Colo. 2013); Samuel A. Evig, Burying the Body—
Dismantling the Corpus Delicti Rule and Adopting the Trustworthiness Standard, 42 The Colorado
Lawyer, 59, 59– 67 (2013).

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016); Kirk Mitchell, Ruling Clears Way for False
Arrest Lawsuit Against Douglas County, The Denver Post, January 12, 2016, http://www.denverpost.
com/news/ci_29374134/ruling-clears-way-for-false-arrest-lawsuit-against-douglas-county.
2
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and other factors interfere with the abilities of police and other observers to
evaluate confession evidence accurately. Part I reviews the corpus delicti rule
and the more flexible trustworthiness standard. Part II examines the process of
corroboration in light of current scientific scholarship, particularly the difficulties faced by police and others who must evaluate corroboration and who risk
losing qualified immunity, and the limits of existing legal safeguards. Part III
reviews the Sanchez case in light of these issues. Part IV provides recommenda
tions for police, legal scholars, legislators, and others to navigate the complex
terrain of the trustworthiness standard, corroboration of confession evidence,
and limits to police officers’ qualified immunity.

I. The Corpus Delicti Rule and the Trustworthiness Standard
Questions regarding corroboration of confession evidence extend across the
jurisdiction of the 10th Circuit. States within the 10th Circuit have become
increasingly variable in their approaches to confession evidence. For example,
Wyoming has retained the corpus delicti rule,3 whereas Utah and Oklahoma have
moved to the trustworthiness standard.4 To complicate these questions further,
Kansas recently moved to a modified corpus delicti rule that applies unless the
alleged crime is not likely to result in forensic evidence. Under these circum
stances, Kansas courts then apply the trustworthiness standard.5 Similarly, New
Mexico uses a modified corpus delicti rule called the Paris rule, in which the
confession itself (i.e., not only independent evidence) can establish corpus delicti.6

A. The corpus delicti rule
The corpus delicti rule applies to cases involving an extrajudicial confession.7
In these cases, the prosecution must prove that the crime to which the suspect
confessed actually occurred,8 and the prosecution must do so with evidence
other than the confession.9 The rule reflects the recognition that false confessions
occur and implies that risk of an erroneous conviction is more important than
David A. Moran, In Defense of Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 Ohio State L. J., 817, 833
n.106 (2003).
3

4
For Utah, see State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2011); for Oklahoma, see Fontenot
v. State, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1994).
5

State v. Dern, 362 P.3d 566 (Kan. 2015); State v. Walker, 153 P.3d 1257 (Kan. 2007).

State v. Hardy, 268 P.3d 1278 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 573–75 and Evig,
supra note 1, at 59 – 65, provide legal analyses of these issues; therefore, this paper only summarizes.
6

7

Moran, supra note 3, at 817.

Typically, this involves proving that “(1) that a death, loss, or injury occurred and (2) that
criminal agency was responsible for that death, injury, or loss” Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 10 (2010); Richard A.
Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First
Century, 2006 Wisconsin L. Rev. 479 (2006).
8

9

Kassin et al., supra note 8, at 10; Leo et al., supra note 8, at 501–502.
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the risk of an erroneous acquittal.10 The risk of erroneous acquittal may be
more substantial than expected; in Colorado, the corpus delicti rule has led to
the prevention or overturning of a conviction in at least eight cases involving
confession evidence, and even these numbers may be an underestimation.11 If
prosecutors decline to prosecute a defendant’s confession that does not have
external corroboration that meets the standards of the corpus delicti rule, such
cases appear likely to remain uncounted.12
With LaRosa, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed more than a century
of precedent related to the corpus delicti rule and joined Utah and Oklahoma in
embracing the trustworthiness standard.13 The Colorado Supreme Court outlined
four criticisms of the corpus delicti rule.14 First, they noted its limited function.15
Although the corpus delicti rule protects innocent people from the effects of
falsely confessing to nonexistent crimes, it does not protect innocents who falsely
confess to actual crimes.16 Second, the Colorado Supreme Court argued that
the rule is “outdated”17 because Miranda v. Arizona and other cases have limited
coercive police interrogation tactics and that the corpus delicti rule is no longer
necessary to protect suspects from coercion during police interrogtation.18 The
movement away from physically coercive police interrogation techniques reflects
cultural and legal changes in the perceptions of police interrogation techniques.19
10

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574; Evig, supra note 1, at 60.

11

Evig, supra note 1, at 60.

12

Id.

13

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 577; Evig, supra note 1, at 59.

14

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 573 –575; see also State v. Dern, 362 P.3d 566, 578–80 (Kan. 2015).

15

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 573.

Id. (citing State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 60 (N.J. 1959)). Kassin et al., supra note 8, at 10
also argued that in some cases applications of the corpus delicti rule can make it easier to convict both
innocent and guilty suspects; see also State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2011).
16

17

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 573.

Miranda v. Arizona, 284 U.S. 436 (1966); LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 573-574. Despite protections
provided by Miranda, most suspects waive their rights. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 275 (1996). Also, innocent suspects are more likely
to do so. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk? 60
Amer. Psychologist, 215, 218 (2005).
18

19
LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574. Physical coercion during police interrogation was typical in the
United States into the 1930s, and these behaviors, including physical beatings, the sweat box, the
water cure (i.e., waterboarding), and other abuses, led to journalistic, legal, and public resistance.
Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America,
18 Crime, L., and Social Change, 35 (1992); Earnest Jerome Hopkins, Our Lawless Police; A
Study of the Unlawful Enforcement of the Law (1931); George W. Wickersham, National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement
(1931). Early reformers of police interrogation, including W. R. Kidd and Fred E. Inbau, led the move
from physical coercion to deception and trickery, see Yale Kamisar, Torture During Interrogations:
A Police Manual’s Foresight, National Law Journal, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 08-021
(March 10, 2008) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1115906; Fred E. Inbau,
Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2nd ed. 1948).
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Third, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the Utah Supreme Court decision
in State v. Mauchley and noted that the corpus delicti rule remains difficult to
define due to the proliferation and increasing complexity of criminal statutes.20
In particular, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the greater precision and detail
in contemporary statutes as compared to common law introduces potential
conflicts with the corpus delicti rule.21 In State v. Mauchley, the Utah Supreme
Court made this argument and as an example cited State v. Archuleta, in which the
same court decided that the corpus delicti rule did not extend to the aggravating
factors required to define capital murder; the corpus delicti rule applied to
the homicide, but the rule was not required for admission to trial of each
aggravating factor.22
Fourth, the most pressing concern expressed by the Colorado Supreme Court
in LaRosa is that the corpus delicti rule “may operate to reward defendants” by
obstructing justice.23 Reliance on the corpus delicti rule may lead perpetrators
to commit crimes that lack tangible evidence of injury (e.g., as in some sexual
assault cases), to seek victims who cannot testify due to age or cognitive disability,
or to ensure the victim’s body cannot be found.24 These concerns formed the
central issue in LaRosa. Although he retracted his confession, LaRosa initially
confessed that he sexually assaulted his two-and-a-half-year-old daughter in a
way that would not be likely to leave forensic evidence.25 On appeal, the defense
argued that the corpus delicti rule prevented LaRosa’s conviction due to the lack of
forensic evidence or testimony from the victim.26 The Colorado Supreme Court
imposed the trustworthiness standard in their ruling but decided that this change
could not retroactively apply to LaRosa due to ex post facto laws; therefore, the
court upheld the reversal of LaRosa’s conviction.27

B. The trustworthiness standard
In LaRosa, the Colorado Supreme Court moved from the corpus delicti rule
to the trustworthiness standard to admit a confession to trial.28 To be admissible
at trial, the prosecution must present evidence to corroborate the confession, and
20

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574; Mauchley, UT 10, 67 P.3d 477 at 487.

21

Mauchley, UT 10, 67 P.3d 477 at 487.

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574; Mauchley, UT 10, 67 P.3d 477 at 487; State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232 (Utah 1993).
22

23

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574.

See also State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904 (Wash. 1996); Kassin et al supra note 8, at 10; B. Don
Taylor, Evidence Beyond Confession: Abolish Arizona’s Corpus Delicti Rule, 41 Arizona Attorney,
22 (2005).
24

25

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 570.

26

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 570.

27

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578 –579; Evig, supra note 1, at 59.

28

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578.
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in LaRosa the court outlined three methods by which evidence can corroborate a
confession under the trustworthiness standard.29 The court, however, “provided
no examples or guidance to illustrate those methods.”30 This paper provides only
a brief review of the methods.
As opposed to the corpus delicti rule which requires independent evidence of
the crime, the first method of corroboration requires “facts that corroborate facts
contained in the confession.”31 This method of corroboration does “not require
independent corroboration for each fact articulated in a confession”; rather, it
requires that “that some facts corroborate some parts of the confession.”32 As
discussed subsequently, this low bar for corroboration reflects legal confidence
that jurors can serve as safeguards for defendants because jurors are expected to be
able to recognize and reject false confessions.
The Sanchez case is described in greater detail below, but at least one aspect
is relevant here. Sanchez confessed falsely in 2009, before the change to the
trustworthiness standard in Colorado, and his confession included details of
the crime presented to him by police interrogators.33 Therefore, his confession
included details that fit available evidence and appears likely to meet the flexible
corroboration threshold of the trustworthiness standard.34
The second method of corroboration listed by the Colorado Supreme Court
is through “facts that establish the crime which corroborate facts contained in
the confession.”35 This method differs from the first method in that “the first
[method of corroboration] uses corroboration to prove a crime occurred, while
the second [method of corroboration] uses corroboration to show who committed
a crime.”36 To use this second method of corroboration, evidence of the crime
must exist independently of the confession.37 One use of this method occurred
in Fontenot; the police had independent evidence of the crime, but none of the
independent evidence proved Fontenot’s guilt. His confession to police as well
as similarities between his confession and the independent evidence allowed the
court to apply the trustworthiness standard and uphold his conviction, even

29

Id.

30

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 574; Evig, supra note 1, at 62.

31

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578.

32

Evig, supra note 1, at 62 (emphasis added).

33

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 757 (10th Cir. 2016).

34

Id. at 752; Mitchell, supra note 2, ¶ 12.

35

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578.

36

Evig, supra note 1, at 62.

37

Id.
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without independent evidence of Fontenot’s involvement.38 Below, this paper
returns to the Fontenot case as an illustration of potential difficulties with the
trustworthiness standard.
The third method of corroboration provided by the Colorado Supreme
Court relies on the “facts under which the confession was made.”39 This method
can involve “facts of any sort whatever, provided only that they tend to produce
a confidence in the truth of the confession.”40 Several considerations may drive a
court’s judgment of the trustworthiness of a confession.41 For example, a confession
to a family member may not raise the same issues of coercion as confession during
police interrogation.42 Additionally, if a suspect confessed without clear motives
to confess falsely or if the suspect confessed repeatedly in differing circumstances,
these and similar factors could provide corroborating evidence; some courts
have not accepted these arguments.43 Beyond these methods, some courts have
viewed a suspect’s confession as corroboration when the confession contained
information believed to be known only to the police and the perpetrator.44 In
several cases, however, false confessions containing details believed to be known

38

Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Evig, supra note 1, at 62–63.

39

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578.

40

LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 577–578 (citing Wigmore on Evidence, § 2071 at 511).

41

Evig, supra note 1, at 63.

Evig, supra note 1, at 63. For a different perspective, see comments by Colorado First
Judicial District Chief Deputy District Attorney Hal Sargent in response to the extra-judicial
confession of Austin Sigg. Sigg was a juvenile when he confessed to his mother that he had murdered
Jessica Ridgeway. Sargent stated, “We wondered if it was a mistake. That was the first question:
Was this a false confession?” Jordan Steffen, Evidence Details Twisted Path That Led Austin Sigg to
Jessica Ridgeway, The Denver Post, December 1, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/2013/11/30/
evidence-details-twisted-path-that-led-austin-sigg-to-jessica-ridgeway/.
42

43
Evig, supra note 1, at 63; For another example of disagreement about the role of context
in corroborating confessions, in 2013 Juan Manuel Velasquez turned himself in and voluntarily
confessed to the murder of his wife. Despite the potential argument that the voluntary nature of this
statement could serve as corroboration of his confession as “facts under which the confession was
made,” Greeley Police Chief Jerry Garner stated, “Even in one where the guy comes in and confesses,
you’ve still got a lot of work to do to see if there’s some reason he’d falsely confess,” Whitney
Phillips, Greeley police above national average in rates of crime solving; crime rate holds steady, The
Greeley Tribune, April 17, 2014, http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/crime/11054934-113/
crime-percent-garner-greeley.
44
Evig, supra note 1, at 63; the paper returns to this question subsequently, particularly with
concerns regarding what Leo calls “misleading specialized knowledge.” Richard A. Leo, Police
Interrogation and American Justice 254 (2008). Kassin calls it “corroboration inflation.” Saul
M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 Amer. Psychologist, 431, 440 (2012).
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only to the police and the perpetrator have been very influential for detectives,
district attorneys, and jurors.45 Across this third method of corroboration, any
form of evidence can corroborate a confession.46

II. Scientific Research and Challenges
to the Corroboration of Confession Evidence
There exists a growing body of scientific literature related to police inter
rogation and confession. These findings can inform police officers, judges,
attorneys, and jurors as they make legal decisions regarding whether to go to
trial, how to seek or challenge the admissibility of confession evidence, and how
to evaluate confession evidence.47 The materials that follow review scientific
findings that can inform corroboration and evaluation of confession evidence.
A central misconception throughout evaluations of confession evidence is
the myth of psychological interrogation: the false and persistent belief that no one
would falsely confess to a crime in the absence of physical coercion (i.e., torture)
or mental illness.48 Contrary to this popular belief, false confessions exist. False
confession contribute to approximately 12% of the mistaken convictions listed
in the National Registry of Exonerations, and in the Innocence Project files
approximately 25% of DNA exonerees falsely confessed, falsely pleaded guilty,
or otherwise incriminated themselves.49 Despite the growing awareness of the
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stanford L. Rev. 1051, 1066
(2010); Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accurary in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument
for Pretrial Reliability Assessment to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 Temple L. Rev. 759, 763 – 65
(2013). In Part III, the paper examines important concerns raised by this form of corroboration,
particularly the possibilities of unintentional contamination and corroboration inflation, both of
which raise risks for police who now face limits to their qualified immunity.
45

46

People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 577–578 (Colo. 2013).

For reviews, see Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogation and Con
A Handbook (2003); Kassin et al., supra note 8; Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson,
The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Int.
33 (2004); Leo, supra note 44; William Douglas Woody et al., False Confessions: The Role
of Police Deception in Interrogation and Jurors’ Perception of the Techniques and their
Outcomes, in Crime: Causes, Types and Victims 1–37 (Alicia E. Hasselm ed., 2011).
47

fessions:

48
Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, in Wrongly
Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice 36 –54, 37 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey eds., 2001); Leo, supra note 44; Woody et al., supra note 47.

% exonerations by contributing factor, National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx# (last visted
Jan. 19, 2017); False Confessions or Admissions, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). Examples of false confessors
include: Jeff Deskovic, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/jeff-deskovic/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016), Marty Tankleff (Richard Firstman & Jay Salpeter, A Criminal
Injustice: A True Crime, a False Confession, and the Fight to Free Marty Tankleff (2008),
and Danial Williams, Joseph Dick, Derek Tice, and Eric Wilson, the four sailors known as the
Norfolk Four, Tom Wells & Richard A. Leo, The wrong guys: Murder, false confessions, and
the Norfolk Four (2008).
49
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possibility of false confession, there exist three primary reasons for the persistence
of the myth.50 First, observers are not typically aware of the pressures present
in a police interrogation,51 including the potential for deception.52 Second, it is
generally hard to believe that someone would act so thoroughly against his or her
own self-interest by falsely confessing to a crime, particularly in cases in which
the penalties for conviction are severe.53 Third, because observers strongly believe
(or even know) that they would never falsely confess, they apply this belief to
others.54 The pervasive yet erroneous myth of psychological interrogation brings
several important obstacles to any evaluation of confession evidence.

A. Causes of false confessions
The three well-recognized factors that increase the risk of false confession
include vulnerability of suspects, psychologically manipulative interrogation
techniques, and investigatory biases.55 First, some suspects are particularly
vulnerable to the pressures of police interrogation. In actual cases, experimental
studies, and studies of self-reported false confessions, juveniles are more likely

50

Leo, supra note 44.

Leo, supra note 44; Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know About
Police Interrogation Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 Behav. Sci. and the L. 381, 397 (2009).
For an additional example of lack of knowledge about police interrogation, people who were
asked to evaluate police interrogation tactics on a list rated the deceptiveness and coerciveness of
the techniques lower than did people who evaluated interrogation tactics embedded in realistic
interrogation transcripts. Potential jurors’ assumptions about specific police interrogation
techniques did not line up with observers’ evaluations of the same techniques embedded in realistic
interrogation transcripts. Krista D. Forrest et al., False-Evidence Ploys and Interrogations: Mock
Jurors’ Perceptions of Ploy Type, Deception, Coercion, and Justification, 30 Behav. Sci. and the L. 342,
359 (2012).
51

52
Deception during police interrogation is common; in specific, a study of police detectives
revealed that 92% report using deception about evidence at least some of the time. Saul M. Kassin et
al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 L. and
Hum. Behav. 381, 388 (2007). Additionally, Rogers et al. found that a majority of recent offenders
mistakenly believed that it was illegal for police to lie about eyewitness evidence. Richard Rogers et
al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16
Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, and L. 300, 310 (2010).
53

Leo, supra note 44.

Leo, supra note 44. Woody and colleagues found that, compared to participants who
believed that it was possible that they could falsely confess, participants who did not believe that they
would ever falsely confess were more likely to convict a defendant who had recanted his confession.
Woody et al., False Confession Plausibility as a Predictor of Juror’s Decisions and Evaluations of Police
Deception, American Psychology-Law Society Convention, (March 2010) (this paper was
presented at the convention).
54

55
Kassin et al., supra note 8; Christian A. Meissner et al., The Need for a Positive Psychological
Approach and Collaborative Effort for Improving Practice in the Interrogation Room, 34 L. and
Hum. Behav. 43 (2010); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions and the Constitution: Problems,
Possibilities, and Solutions, The Constitution and the Future of Criminal Justice in America
169–186 (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013).
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than adults to confess falsely56 as are people with cognitive disabilities 57 or
mental illnesses58 and those with some personality traits such as suggestibility.59
As discussed subsequently, Sanchez had a cognitive disability that shaped
his behavior during interrogation; the police accepted Sanchez’s confession
despite their recognition of his atypical behavior related to his difficulty
understanding questions.60
Second, some interrogation tactics raise the likelihood of false confession.
For example, false-evidence ploys (FEPs) are false claims by police to have
incriminating evidence against the defendant when this evidence does not exist.
FEPs “have been implicated in the vast majority of documented false confession
cases.”61 Additionally, a wide range of experimental studies have found that
FEPs increase the likelihood of false confessions.62 Further, a recent meta-analysis
revealed that FEPs increase false confession rates across a range of methods
See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed:
Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. and Hum. Behav. 141, 152 (2003); Gisli H. Gudjonsson
et al., Custodial Interrogation, False Confession, and Individual Differences: A National Study Among
Icelandic Youth, 41 Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2006); JL Viljoen, Legal Decisions
of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with
Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 L. and Hum. Behav. 253 (2005).
56

According to Kassin et al, supra note 8, at 19, “of the first 200 DNA exonerations in
the U.S., 35% of the false confessors were 18 years or younger and/or had a developmental
disability.” Gudjonsson and Clare found that a sample of false confessors had the lower IQ scores
and higher suggestibility scores than true confessors or those who resisted confession. Gisli H.
Gudjonsson & Isabel C.H. Clare, The Relationship Between Confabulation and Intellectual Ability,
Memory, Interrogative Suggestibility, and Acquiescence, 3 Personality and Individual Differences
333 –38 (1995).
57

58
Allison D. Redlich et al., Comparing True and False Confessions Among Persons with Serious
Mental Illness, 17 Psych., Pub. Pol’y, and L., 394 (2011); Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported
False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 L. and Hum. Behav.,
79, 90 (2011); Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness, Police Interrogations, and the Potential for False
Confession, 55 Psychiatric Services 19, 21 (2004). There also exist important concerns about
juveniles who have mental illnesses. See Allison D. Redlich, Double Jeopardy in the Interrogation
Room: Young Age and Mental Illness, 62 Am. Psychologist 609, 610 (2007).

Personality factors associated with increased likelihood of false confession include
compliance and suggestibility (see Gudjonsson, supra note 47) as well as higher authoritarianism
(which includes submission to legitimate authorities, e.g., police) and lower internal locus of
control. See Krista D. Forrest et al, Suspect Personality, Police Interrogations, and False Confessions:
Maybe It Is Not Just the Situation, 40 Personality and Individual Differences, 621, 626 (2005).
59

60

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 2016); Mitchell, supra note 2.

61

Kassin et al., supra note 8, at 12.

See e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology Of False Confes
sions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 Psychol. Sci., 125, 127 (1996); Jennifer
T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confession,” 35 L.
and Hum. Behav. 327, 335 (2011); Robert M. Nash & Kimberley A Wade, Innocent But Proven
Guilty: Eliciting Internalized False Confessions Using Doctored-Video Evidence, 23 Applied Cognitive
Psychol. 624, 633 (2009). As noted by John E. Reid and Associates and others, experimental
studies have important limitations. John E. Reid and Associates, Detection and Deception: Research
62
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and studies.63 In one study, 100% of innocent suspects falsely confessed when
presented with claims of fabricated video evidence or when shown fabricated video
evidence.64 Other deceptive techniques, such as minimization (i.e., minimizing
the legal or moral severity of the crime) and maximization (i.e., maximizing
the legal or moral severity of the crime),65 have also been found to increase false
confession rates in experimental studies.66
A third source of false confessions arises from investigatory biases and is directly
related to questions of corroboration of confessions under the trustworthiness
standard. Police have a well-documented guilty bias, such that they are more likely
to assume that suspects are guilty rather than innocent.67 Beyond these general
biases, other issues exist. Some of those who train interrogators recommend a
behavioral analysis interview to assess whether the suspect is lying.68 If the
police decide that the suspect’s behavior indicates deception, police then move
from the interview to an interrogation, generally starting with “direct, positive
confrontation.”69 Despite some observers’ high confidence in the deception
detection abilities of police, there exists a robust scientific literature involving
hundreds of peer-reviewed studies and several meta-analyses demonstrating that

v. Reality (last visited Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.reid.com/pdfs/RealityvsResearch.pdf. Within
the bounds of ethical research, scholars cannot induce the stress of an actual interrogation, inter
rogate research participants for hours, or employ consequences that simulate the actual consequences
of conviction for a serious crime; for a review see Woody et al., supra note 47).
63
Stewart et al., Meta-Analysis of Confession Research, American Psychology-Law Society
Convention (March, 2012) (paper was presented at the convention).
64
Nash & Wade, supra note 62, at 633. Participants engaged in a computer-based gambling
task and were instructed not to cheat. No participants cheated, but researchers confronted all
participants with one of two forms of an FEP. Half of participants were told that incriminating
video evidence existed, and the other half were shown fabricated video of themselves cheating.
Across both conditions, all participants confessed falsely, but participants who saw fabricated video
confessed with less resistance. These and other findings led Perillo & Kassin to call FEPs “Perhaps,
the most controversial tactic permissible within [the Reid technique of interrogation].” Id. at 327.
65
Jerome H. Skolnik & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 Crim. Just.
J. 3, 5 – 6 (1992).
66
For minimization see Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions
Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 Psychol. Sci. 481, 485 (2005); for both minimization
and maximization (i.e., exaggerating the legal or moral severity of the crime), see Allyson J. Horgan
et al., Minimization and Maximization Techniques: Assessing The Perceived Consequences of Confessing
and Confession Diagnosticity, 18 Psychol., Crime, and L. 65, 76 (2012).

Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of
Truth and Deception, 26 L. and Hum. Behav. 469, 478 (2002).
67

Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions V (5th ed. 2011); Brian
C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, Behavior Symptom Analysis, in The Investigator Anthology
(John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. ed., 1999).
68

Direct, positive confrontation is an unambiguous statement that the suspect is guilty and
that police are overwhelmingly confident in the suspect’s guilt, Inbau et al., supra note 68, at V.
69
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the accuracy of these methods remains far closer to chance than many assume.70 This
combination of factors—police who are biased toward guilt and highly confident
of their abilities to detect deception but likely to perform close to chance—can
lead to the interrogation of innocent suspects as well as the misinterpretation of
innocent suspects’ responses by police.71 These biases then affect evaluations of
evidence, particularly attempts to corroborate confession evidence.72
For example, in Oakland, California, police arrested a sixteen-year-old
suspect for homicide.73 The police were highly confident in his guilt, and they
viewed his interrogation and confession through the lens of their biases.74 During
the interrogation, the juvenile drew the crime scene in a way that did not fit
witnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator’s actions, and the suspect did not include
a relevant alley in his description of the crime scene until police told him about
it.75 Neither this apparent indication of contamination—the inclusion in the
confession of relevant details only after these were provided by officers—nor the
failure of his confession to fit the evidence raised concerns about his confession
or guilt.76 As officers who remained highly confident in his guilt shouted at him,
the innocent suspect thought of a way to end the intense interrogation and to
demonstrate that his confession was false.77 He stated that he gave the murder
70
William R. King & Thomas M. Dunn, Detecting Deception in Field Settings: A Review and
Critique of the Criminal Justice and Psychological Literatures, 33 Policing: An Int’l J. of Police
Strategies & Mgmt 305, 312 –16 (2010); see also Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129
Psychol. Bull. 74 (2003); Charles F. Bond & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments,
10 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 214 (2006); Charles F. Bond & Bella M. DePaulo,
Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 Psychol. Bull. 477 (2008). For
challenges to these claims, see J. Pete Blair et al., The Gap Between Reality and Research: Another Look
at Detecting Deception in Field Settings, 35 Policing: An Int’l J. of Police Strategies & Mgmt.
723 (2012); John E. Reid and Associates, Detection and Deception: Research v. Reality (last visited
Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.reid.com/pdfs/RealityvsResearch.pdf.

These biases may be particularly pronounced for suspects who are African-American.
Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal Interrogations: Why Black Suspects Are at Risk
for Confessing Falsely, 17 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 562, 565 (2011).
71

An example related to interrogation but not false confession involves Robert Dewey.
During his interrogation and in other settings, Dewey behaved in ways that police believed were
consistent with guilt (e.g., Dewey appeared agitated, lied to police about his name, and hid from
police during the investigation), and police were highly and justifiably confident in his guilt. In fact,
he was guilty of multiple crimes; Dewey was a convicted felon who had stolen a handgun and was
using illegal drugs. But, Dewey was not guilty of the sexual assault and murder for which he was
convicted, Nancy Lofholm & Jessica Fender, Newly Freed Robert Dewey’s Odd Behavior in the 1990s
Didn’t Help Him, Denver Post, May 5, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_20526167/
newly-freed-robert-deweys-odd-behavior-1990s-didnt?source=pkg.
72

David K. Shipler, Why Do Innocent People Confess?, New York Times February 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/why-do-innocent-people-confess.html.
73

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.
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weapon to his grandfather, and police accepted this claim.78 The suspect hoped
that this obvious falsehood in his confession would save him—both of his
grandfathers were deceased.79 These and other inconsistencies did not lead police
to drop charges or reduce their confidence in his guilt.80 The juvenile suspect
avoided the consequences of his false confession only because he discovered
exonerating evidence that had been overlooked by everyone, including police,
prosecutors, the trial judge, his own defense attorneys, and other investigators: he
had been incarcerated at the time of the crime.81
Similar inconsistencies have existed in cases in which the defendant was
convicted. As noted previously, in Fontenot, for example, prosecutors sought and
courts upheld a conviction despite substantial conflicts between the confession
and the evidence, including the manner of homicide, the location of the body,
and whether the body had been burned.82 In these and other examples, confession
evidence that fit existing police biases overwhelmed other considerations related
to corroboration. Unlike the 10th Circuit’s decision in Sanchez, courts in Fontenot
and similar cases did not raise questions about recklessness or challenge the
officers’ qualified immunity.83
78

Id.

79

Id.

Id. As discussed below, Sanchez included a known falsehood in his confession, but, as
in the case with the juvenile in Oakland, this false detail did not prevent police from accepting
his confession.
80

81

Shipler, supra note 73.

Although courts have emphasized that facts contained in the confession must be consistent
with facts known via other means, see Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);
Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), as described by Evig, supra note 1, at
63, and note 57, for a case in which prosecutors sought and courts upheld a conviction using
the trustworthiness standard despite substantial inconsistencies between the confession and the
details of the crime. The Fontenot case raises particular issues. Evig, supra note 1, at 63, embraced
Fontenot’s conviction as a productive example of the application of the trustworthiness standard.
Despite this enthusiasm, the Oklahoma Innocence Project views Fontenot’s confession as false and
his conviction as a miscarriage of justice, these contentions remain unresolved. Jaclyn Cosgrove,
Report Sparks Debate Over Innocence of Karl Fontenot, NewsOK, Aug. 4, 2013, http://newsok.com/
article/3868927. See also the confession of Damon Thibodeaux, who falsely confessed to using a
grey or white cord to commit a murder that was actually committed with a red cord; the lack of fit
of his confession to the evidence in these and many other details did not preclude his conviction
Damon Thibodeaux, Innocence Project, (last visited Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.innocenceproject.
org/cases/damon-thibodeaux/. As presented throughout this paper, numerous other examples exist
in which defendants were convicted despite failure of the evidence to corroborate their confessions.
82

83
For another example, in the highly publicized case of the teenagers wrongly convicted in
the Central Park Jogger case, almost all details from their confessions differed from each other, from
the physical evidence, and from the facts in the case; as noted by Garrett, “those inconsistencies
did not prevent a conviction at trial.” Garrett supra note 40 at 1090. See also the case of Jeff
Deskovic, who was not implicated by the DNA evidence (which indicated a different perpetrator)
or any other material evidence in the case beyond his confession; he was wrongfully convicted
and spent 16 years in prison. Jeff Deskovic, supra note 49. As discussed subsequently, with very
few exceptions, this paper does not suggest that these wrongful convictions result from intentional
police misconduct.
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B. Confessions, contamination, and corroboration inflation
As demonstrated above, confessions carry so much power that people
often ignore inconsistencies between the confession and the independent
evidence, regardless of whether states rely on the corpus delicti rule or the
trustworthiness standard. Several factors increase the likelihood of corroboration
errors in cases involving confessions, many of which were present in Sanchez, as
discussed below.84
First, police, district attorneys, and others want to be correct in their
decisions, particularly in high-stakes questions such as guilt in cases involving
severe crimes. As humans, we are motivated reasoners;85 we want to be correct,
and we are subject to human biases in our thinking. We tend to seek confirmation
rather than falsification of our beliefs.86 These biases are strongest when our
beliefs are important to us, as we expect decisions about a suspect’s guilt to be for
police officers, prosecutors, courts, and legal observers.87
Second, as described previously, confessions are so influential that
police, prosecutors, and even defense attorneys may overlook or misinterpret
exculpatory evidence, as they did with the Oakland juvenile, and confessions may
corrupt other evidence. For example, confessions can lead to such confidence
in guilt that some prosecutors have aggressively attacked and devalued DNA
evidence in trial and post-conviction appeals when the DNA evidence challenges
confession evidence.88 Confessions carry such power that several cases exist in
which defendants have been convicted at trial after being excluded by DNA
evidence.89 For example, in People v. Rivera, despite DNA evidence that indicated
84

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016).

Our goals affect our reasoning, and we are more critical of claims that criticize our preexisting beliefs and less critical of claims that support our pre-existing beliefs. Ziva Kuda, The Case
for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 482 (1990).
85

For a specific legal example of motivated reasoning, scholars have also found that
experienced investigators rate the credibility and reliability of a witness as lower when that witness
provided testimony that was inconsistent with an existing hypothesis about the identity of the
perpetrator in a criminal case, see Karl Ask & Par Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal
Investigators’ Judgments of Witness Reliability, 37 J. of Applied Soc. Psychol. 561, 579 (2007).
86

87
Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Soc.
ed., 2008).

cognition:

From Brains

to

Culture (1st

88
See Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, New York Times Magazine,
November 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. For an additional example, after Bruce Godschalk’s DNA exoneration,
the district attorney in his case maintained that Godschalk was guilty. Mark Stroh & Ralph Vigoda,
DNA Frees Man Jailed for 15 Years, Philadelphia Inquirer, February 15, 2002.
89
See Kassin, supra note 44, at 433. In the case of the Norfolk Four, the DNA evidence
did not indicate any of the four sailors who falsely confessed, and the person matched by the
DNA confessed to having committed the crime alone; these details did not prevent the wrongful
conviction of all four false confessors. Wells & Leo, supra note 49. See also Jeff Deskovic, supra
note 49.
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another perpetrator, prosecutors sought and gained the conviction of Juan Rivera
on the basis of his confession.90 To maintain that the Rivera’s confession was
valid, prosecutors claimed that the eleven-year-old victim must have engaged
in consensual sexual relations with an unknown man before being assaulted by
Rivera, who, they argued, left no evidence.91
Police confidence in a suspect’s guilt may affect corroboration of confessions in other ways, including contamination of the confession. Contamination
occurs when interrogators or others provide crime details, intentionally or
otherwise, to the suspect so that the suspect’s confession contains misleading
information that appears to indicate guilt.92 Garrett evaluated the contents of
proven false confessions (i.e., confessions by convicted defendants who were
later exonerated by DNA or other evidence), and his review of these cases
demonstrated that contamination is nearly ubiquitous in documented false
confessions.93 He found that thirty-six of the thirty-eight defendants confessed
to details of the crime known only to police and to the perpetrator, and these
defendants did so despite not being the actual perpetrator.94 Despite consistent
recommendations to avoid contamination and to seek independent corroboration
to evaluate confession evidence,95 the overwhelmingly likely source of information
about the crime is the interrogation itself.96 Yet, in twenty-seven of the thirtyeight cases, officers provided sworn testimony in court that they had not provided
the crime details to the suspect.97 Police officers may, however, unintentionally
contaminate a confession.98 In cases in which the confession is contaminated,

90

See People v. Rivera, 962 N.E. 2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).

91

Martin, supra note 88; see also Jeff Deskovic, supra note 49.

92

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1053.

93

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1066.

94

Id. at 1057.

95

Inbau et al., supra note 68; Jayne & Buckley, supra note 68.

In some cases, contamination has other sources. For example, highly confident police
viewed 15-year old Timothy Masters’s knowledge that the victim’s body had been mutilated as
evidence of Masters’s guilt, but Masters learned about the mutilation through his classmate, a
member of the Explorers group who helped search the field where the victim’s body was found.
Masters & Lehto, Drawn to injustice: The wrongful conviction of Timothy Masters (2012).
Despite this example and the possibility of other sources of contamination (e.g., mistakenly
publicized facts, a separate guilty suspect who shared crime information with other jail inmates, or
even suspects’ guesses), Garrett, supra note 45, argues that interrogators are the most likely source of
contamination.
96

97

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1057.

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1074. Although Garrett made no claim regarding officers’ intent,
this author argues that most if not all of the examples of contamination described by Garrett and
others were unintentional, that officers believed in good faith that the suspects were genuinely
guilty, and that the officers believed that the confessions were true. Simply stated, police seek
to be right, and, in every situation in which this author has inquired, police interrogators have
universally stated that inducing and believing a false confession (and using that false confession to
98
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false confessions contain details that match police knowledge of evidence, as in
the Sanchez case discussed subsequently,99 and the apparent, though incorrect,
corroboration of the confessions by the evidence can powerfully influence police
and other observers.
State v. Bloodsworth provides another example of unintentional con
tamination.100 Kirk Bloodsworth was wrongly convicted and spent more than
eight years in prison.101 Police had strong reasons to suspect that Bloodsworth
committed a heinous crime with a rock. Multiple eyewitnesses testified
(incorrectly) that they had seen Bloodsworth with the victim, and Bloodsworth
made ambiguous statements to police.102 Additionally, the first police interrogators
placed a rock covered in fake blood in the interrogation room to observe
Bloodsworth’s interactions with potential evidence (i.e., an orchestrated FEP).103
This technique affected his later conviction in two ways. First, his interactions
with the rock further convinced police of his guilt. Indeed, Bloodsworth
believed any interaction would appear to indicate his guilt to the highly confident
interrogators. As Bloodsworth stated, “If I brought up the rock, asked about it,
it would look like I knew something. If I didn’t look at it, didn’t ask about it; it

support a conviction that turns out to be wrongful) would be the one of the worst events of an entire
career in law enforcement. Therefore, this paper argues that most, if not all of these cases, reveal
errors, potentially reflecting negligence or recklessness, rather than malfeasance.
99

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 2016); Mitchell, supra note 2.

State v. Bloodsworth, No. 03-K-84-003138, Seq. No: 92-93 (Cir. Ct. for Balt. Cnty.
Ct. May 7, 1992); Meredith L. Pendergrass, Maryland Repeals the Death Penalty, But Leaves Five
on Death Row: What Has the State Learned from Kirk Bloodsworth? 44 U. of Baltimore Law Forum
109 (2014).
100

Kirk Bloodsworth, Innocence Project, (last visited April 20, 2016), http://www.innocence
project.org/cases/kirk-bloodsworth/
101

102
Id; Bloodsworth, No. 03-K-84-003138. Bloodsworth stated that he had done something
that would impact his marriage. Highly confident police presented these statements at trial as
evidence of Bloodsworth’s guilt. Bloodsworth noted that his statements involved his failure to buy
groceries as requested by his wife, not involvement in the murder or any other crime. The perception
that he had incriminated himself persisted through officers’ introduction of these statements at trial
and then beyond. Even the Innocence Project website listed Bloodsworth as someone who had
falsely confessed; when Professor Krista D. Forrest from the University of Nebraska at Kearney
shared this with Bloodsworth, he immediately contacted the Innocence Project, and they reclassified
him. Personal Communication with Krista D. Forrest, Professor, University of Nebraska at
Kearney (2009).

See Innocence Project, supra note 96. An orchestrated false-evidence ploy is a deceptive
strategy in which police ask a suspect to interact with fabricated evidence, Wagner & Forrest, “Ploy
complexity and its influence on mock jurors’ interrogation evaluations and verdicts,” presented at
the American Psychology-Law Society convention in Vancouver, BC (2010). The police officers
assumed, incorrectly, that observing Bloodsworth’s interaction with the rock would enable them to
determine whether he was guilty.
103
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looked like I was avoiding something. There was no right thing to do.”104 Second,
a subsequent team of investigators did not know that the initial interrogators
had presented Bloodsworth with a bloody rock, and the subsequent investigators
incorrectly believed that only the police and the perpetrator could possibly
identify the murder weapon. Therefore, when Bloodsworth mentioned a rock
during a later interrogation, police viewed his knowledge of the rock as further
evidence of his guilt rather than evidence of contamination by the first group
of interrogators.105
In these and other cases, defendants included details in their confessions
that only the perpetrators could know, even though these defendants were not
the perpetrators. Observers, including jurors, judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys, believe that the inclusion of crime details in the suspect’s confession
(i.e., “misleading specialized knowledge”)106 shows that he or she must be guilty,
even when the suspect is repeating material learned during the interrogation.
Even the officers who conduct the interrogation may believe firmly but
erroneously that they did not provide these details.107 One officer who publicly
described his experience inducing and believing a false confession noted that
he, his police colleagues, the district attorney, and the defense attorney believed
the false confession.108 As the officer lamented, “we all still believed that she was
guilty . . . How did she know the details that she did?”109 Years later, a review of
the video-recorded interrogation demonstrated what the officer did not realize at
the time. “To demonstrate the strength of our case, we [had] showed the suspect
our evidence, and unintentionally fed her details that she was able to parrot back
to us at a later time.”110 Only the video-recording enabled observers to verify the
contamination despite the confidence of all observers in the suspect’s guilt.
A second aspect of contamination—formatting—increases the difficulty of
discovering false yet contaminated confessions. Formatting:
104
William Douglas Woody & Krista D. Forrest, Effects of False-Evidence Ploys and Expert
Testimony on Jurors’ Verdicts, Recommended Sentences, and Perceptions of Confession Evidence, 27
Behav. Sci. & the L. 333, 349 –50 (2009) (citing personal communication with Krista D. Forrest
and Kirk Bloodsworth (2007)).
105

Kirk Bloodsworth, supra note 101.

106

Leo, supra note 44, at 254.

As noted, Garret, in his review of proven false confessions, in 71% of cases, police officers
provided sworn testimony that they did not contaminate the confession. Garrett, supra note 45,
at 1074.
107

Jim Trainum, I Took a False Confession- So Don’t Tell Me it Doesn’t Happen!, Seeing the
Forest, Sept. 20, 2007, http://seeingtheforest.com/i-took-a-false-confession-so-dont-tell-me-itdoesnt-happen/.
108

109
Id. In this case the confession did not lead to a miscarriage of justice only because, unlike
some other cases, the police continued their investigation and found the suspect’s alibi to be credible;
the charges were then dismissed.
110

Id.
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goes beyond the mere feeding or leaking of details. In addition,
interrogators format a suspect’s postadmission narrative by
suggesting how and why the crime occurred, providing possible
motives and plausible explanations, correcting, suggesting and
filling in missing crime-relevant information, and directing the
suspect to . . . conclusions about his alleged actions and the
events of the crime.111
Formatting by police improves the apparent fit between the evidence and
the confession as police suggest motives (sometimes called “themes” as discussed
below) and guide the confessor to include known details of the evidence.112
The resulting strong fit between the confession and the known evidence
makes future attempts at meeting the corroboration requirements of the trustworthiness standard more likely to be successful, even if the confession is false.
The formatting of confessions has other long term implications; as discussed
below, jurors find confessions more believable when confessions are rich in detail
as is common in formatted and contaminated confessions.113 The ubiquity of
contamination and formatting in false confession cases increases available detail
and presents severe obstacles to police in any attempt to corroborate the confession
and to defendants in any attempt to recant a confession. Only a video-recording of
the interrogation can provide evidence regarding presence or absence of potential
contamination by police, and proposed reforms for uses of confession evidence
should address the difficulties raised by contamination and formatting.
If contamination and formatting raise these difficulties, what signs exist to
suggest that a confession is reliable rather than contaminated? If a video-recording
exists, police, other investigators, and courts should examine the complete
recording and apply the Ofshe-Leo Test to evaluate the fit of the evidence with
the confession and the post-admission narrative.114 The Ofshe-Leo Test identifies
three markers of reliability in confessions and post-admission narratives.115 Does
the confession: (1) lead to evidence unknown to police; (2) include unusual details
of the crime that have not been publicized; and/or (3) include typical details of
the crime that have not been publicized and that would be difficult to guess?116
These criteria must be used in conjunction with a video-recording to assess the
111

Leo et al., supra note 45, at 776.

Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 45, at 776. For interrogation themes see Inbau
et al. supra note 68; Jayne & Buckley, supra note 68.
112

Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 19 Psychol., Crime, and L. 111, 124 (2013).
113

Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confession: Deprivation
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. of Crim. L &
Criminology 429, 438–39 (1998); Leo et al., supra note 8, at 520–522.
114

115

Id.

116

Id.
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reliability of the confession and the fit to the evidence. Unfortunately, unusual
or unpublicized details sometimes exist in contaminated false confessions, and a
video-recording is essential to evaluate potential contamination and formatting
and to ensure that investigators did not provide these details. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Godschalk, Bruce Godschalk’s confession contained detailed
reports of both unusual and mundane details known only to the perpetrator and
to police investigators.117 Investigators who interrogated Godschalk, however,
audio-recorded only the confession; without a video-recording of the entire
interrogation, no evaluation of potential contamination and formatting was
possible.118 Later observers could not evaluate whether Godschalk provided
nonpublicized details on his own or only after learning with these details by the
police. Similarly, in the Bloodsworth case, the lack of a video-recording of the
initial interrogation prevented investigators from learning how Bloodsworth
knew about the unpublicized murder weapon.119 Below, the paper returns to these
issues of mandatory video-recording and reliability assessment in subsequent
discussions of statutory reforms in Colorado and other states in the district of the
10th Circuit.
Beyond omission or misinterpretation of relevant evidence, a third concern
related to corroboration is that confessions are so powerful that they can corrupt
other forms of evidence such as eyewitness testimony, fingerprint identification,
and polygraph results. This contention has support from both experimental
studies and archival analyses of actual cases.120 For example, in one experimental
study, participants observed a crime and then attempted to identify the suspect,
who was not present in the photographic lineup.121 Two days later, researchers
informed some participants that specific members of the lineup denied guilt or
confessed during an interrogation; many participants who learned that a particular
lineup member confessed then erroneously identified the confessor as the
perpetrator.122 In addition to eyewitness testimony, experimental studies

Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Bruce Godschalk,
Innocence Project, (last visited April 20, 2016) http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/brucegodschalk/; Leo, Neufeld, Drizin, & Taslitz, supra note 45, at 761–764.
117

118

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1080.

119

Kirk Bloodsworth, supra note 101.

E.g., Lisa.E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can
Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications? 20 Psychol. Sci. 122, 123 (2009); Itiel Dror & David
Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. of Forensic Identification 600, 612 (2006); Eitan Elaad
et al., The Effects of Prior Expectations and Outcome Knowledge on Polygraph Examiners’ Decisions, 7
J. of Behav. Decision Making 279 (1994).
120

121

Hasel & Kassin, supra note 120, at 123.

Id at 124. The actual perpetrator was never present in the lineup. In particular, for
participants who had (incorrectly) identified a perpetrator, 61% changed their identification to the
purported confessor, and for participants who had (correctly) failed to identify a perpetrator, 50%
then (incorrectly) identified the purported confessor.
122
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have demonstrated that confession evidence can corrupt experts’ fingerprint
identifications123 and experts’ interpretations of polygraph results as well as other
forensic evidence.124
In addition to the experimental scholarship about the power of confession
evidence to affect forensic analyses, other substantial concerns exist regarding the
interaction of forensic science and confessions. One particular concern is that
the errors overwhelmingly favor the prosecution. For instance, a recent study
revealed that twenty-six of twenty-eight FBI analysts provided erroneous state
ments about microscopic hair analysis in 96% of 268 examined cases, including
94% of thirty-five cases in which defendants were sentenced to death.125 These
forensic errors interact with confession evidence in important ways that affect
perceived corroboration. Other scholars have examined documented false
confessions and revealed important findings about the power of confessions to
affect other evidence.126 In particular, errors of evidence are more common in
cases involving false confession than in other cases.127 Additionally, the errors are
disappointingly common; two thirds of false confession cases include errors in
forensic science, and 65% of false confession cases involve multiple additional
errors.128 Furthermore, in cases involving multiple errors, “confessions were
most likely to have been obtained first,” likely increasing the confidence in
forensic examiners’ pro-guilt yet erroneous conclusions regarding corroboration
of confessions.129
Beyond biased forensic science, confessions impact other aspects of trials.
For example, researchers examined the first 273 DNA exoneration cases from
the files of the Innocence Project and evaluated the prevalence of what the

123

Dror & Charlton, supra note 113 at 612.

Elaad et al., supra note 113. Additionally, Dror and Hampikian reported that “DNA
mixture interpretation is subjective” and may also be subject to biases related to confession evidence.
Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation,
51 Sci. & Just. 204, 204. Additionally, confession evidence affects handwriting comparisons of
lay observers. Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. Kassin, Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting
Evidence? An Empirical Test of the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 37 L. and Hum. Behav. 256,
265 (2013).
124

Paul Cates et al., National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, FBI Testimony on
Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors In At Least 90% of Cases In Ongoing Review: 26 of
28 FBI Analysts Provided Testimony Or Reports With Errors, Apr. 20, 2015, http://www.nacdl.
org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=37023.
125

126
Saul M. Kassin et al., Confessions That Corrupt: Evidence from the DNA Exoneration Case
Files, 23 Psychol. Sci. 41, 42– 43 (2012).
127

Id.

128

Id. at 43.

129

Id. at 43.
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Innocence Project called “bad lawyering” and “government misconduct.”130 They
found that both were more prevalent in cases with false confessions.131 “These
differences suggest that confession cases skew the adversarial process in ways that
are detrimental to the defense.”132 Simply stated, what a trial or appellate court
may view as independent corroboration of a confession may not be so.133
Confession evidence may influence investigators and district attorneys
(particularly in decisions about whether to continue an investigation or to evaluate
additional suspects), affect investigators’ interactions with and evaluations of
the suspect, and corrupt other evidence. Among other effects, a confession may
lead to “tunnel vision;”134 police may view all evidence through the lens of the
confession and may focus extensively on the confessor, close cases prematurely,
and cease reviewing other leads and other suspects.135 These choices may leave a
perpetrator at large in the community during the process of corroboration of the
confession or, if the confession wrongfully appears corroborated, indefinitely.136
These findings raise important legal concerns for the corroboration of confes
sions under either the corpus delicti rule or the trustworthiness standard. The
list of potential factors that could artificially inflate corroboration suggests that
the flexibility of the trustworthiness standard sets the bar for perceived
corroboration very low, particularly if a confession occurs before evaluation of
other evidence and affects the collection and evaluation of later evidence.

C. Legal safeguards
The process of pretrial corroboration by police and other investigators is
one safeguard to prevent false confessions from leading to wrongful convictions,
and it remains rife with difficulties. A series of other safeguards exist, including
130
Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. Kassin, Confession Errors as “Structural Defects,” Am. Psychol.-L.
Society Convention (March 2012) (paper presented at the convention).
131

Id.

132

Kassin, supra note 44, at 439.

Another substantial concern is that cultural biases may affect views of confessions; Pickel
and colleagues used a single interrogation video but described the suspect to mock jurors as White
or Arab-American; participants who viewed him as Arab-American viewed his confession as more
voluntary and more authentic, were more likely to render guilty verdicts, and rated him as more
guilty. Kerri L. Pickel et al., Conceptualizing Defendants as Minorities Leads Mocks Jurors to Make
Biased Evaluations in Retracted Confession Cases, 19 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 56 (2013). Additionally,
as noted previously, suspects who are African-American may appear more guilty to police than
other suspects and may behave in ways that are consistent with police officers’ beliefs about guilt.
Najdowski, supra note 71.
133

134
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2 Wisconsin L. Rev. 291, 291 (2006).
135

Kassin, supra note 39 at 433.

For example, the actual perpetrator of the crime to which Deskovic confessed and for
which he was wrongfully convicted committed another murder three years later. See Jeff Deskovic,
supra note 49.
136
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voluntariness hearings, juries, and judicial review.137 This paper briefly examines
these safeguards to emphasize the challenges raised by the difficulties of
corroboration and the risks faced by defendants who confess falsely.

1. Voluntariness hearings
Voluntariness hearings evaluate the voluntariness of a confession, but not
the reliability or truth value of the confession, and if the court finds the confession
voluntary it is admitted to trial. There are several important criticisms of these
processes. First, Miranda warnings provide only very limited protection, as
discussed previously. For example, in a sample of 40 exonerated false confessors,
all had waived their Miranda rights and almost all attempted to suppress the
confessions from court.138 For these defendants, the courts’ reviews of disputed
confessions emphasized voluntariness and relied heavily on valid Miranda
warnings and waivers,139 even if these warnings provide only limited protection.
Second, suppression hearings focus almost exclusively on voluntariness. All of
the false confessors in Garrett’s sample who attempted to suppress their confes
sions failed because courts found their confessions, though false, to be voluntary.140
Third, the preponderance of evidence standard, the standard of proof used in
suppression hearings, creates “a practical reality: a low standard of proof leads
to the erroneous admission of coerced confessions, which, in turn, often leads
to unreliable verdicts.”141 Fourth, jurors and juries generally recognize but do
not reject coercion, and they readily believe confession evidence.142 Fifth, judges

137
Jurors, juries, and judges form relevant safeguards for cases that go to trial, however, and
false confessions affect defendant’s trial options. Those who plead guilty cannot benefit from jurors’
or juries’ actions. In a study of documented false confessions, Redlich found that defendants who
had confessed falsely were approximately four times more likely to have falsely pleaded guilty than
were defendants who had not confessed. Allison D. Redlich, False Confessions and False Guilty
Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in Police Interrogation and False Confessions: Current
Research, Practice, and Policy (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010).
138

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1058.

139

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).

140

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1058.

Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable Relationship
Between an Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1185,
1218 (2010).
141

142
Woody & Forrest, supra note 104; Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions
and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 L. and Hum. Behav. 27, 42
(1997); William Douglas Woody et al., Comparing the Effects of Explicit and Implicit False-Evidence
Ploys on Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, Sentencing Recommendations, and Perceptions of Police Interrogation,
20 Psychol., Crime, & L. 603, 612 (2013); William Douglas Woody et al., The Effects of Jury
Deliberations on Verdicts and Perceptions of Guilt in Trials Involving False-Evidence Ploys During Police
Interrogation, presented at the Am. Psychol.-L. Soc’y Convention, (March, 2012) (presented at
the convention).
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struggle to evaluate confession evidence.143 Nothing about Miranda warnings,
Miranda waivers, or suppression hearings protected any defendant in Garrett’s
sample from the consequences of false confession.144
These difficulties combine with the ubiquity of contamination, formatting,
and the influence of confession evidence on other evidence and evaluations.
The resulting circumstances make independent and accurate corroboration of a
confession extremely difficult at best, particularly using the range of corroboration
options available under the trustworthiness standard. As one scholar noted, “It
should not be surprising that [all of the documented false confessions identified
by DNA exoneration prior to 2010] were admitted [to trial], because the
voluntariness standard is forgiving and vague.”145

2. Jurors and juries
Courts have remained optimistic about jurors’ abilities to recognize and
reject coerced confessions, and a series of judicial decisions reflects this
optimism. First, in Lego v. Twomey, the U.S. Supreme Court established the
preponderance of evidence standard for the admission of confessions to trial
and noted that this placed responsibility for recognizing and rejecting coerced
confessions on the jury.146 Despite this substantial responsibility for jurors, the
court emphatically expressed confidence that jurors could accurately evaluate
confessions and determine guilt.147
Second, prior to Arizona v. Fulminante (1991),148 improper admission of
a coerced confession was overwhelmingly likely to lead to a new trial.149 Since
1991, however, jurors carry additional responsibilities. In Arizona v. Fulminante,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that improper admission of a coerced confession
could be subject to harmless error analysis by appellate courts.150 The notion that
improper admission of a confession to trial could be a harmless error rests on the
assumptions that jurors can recognize and reject coerced confessions and then
D. Brian Wallace & Saul Kassin, Harmless Error Analysis: How Do Judges Respond to
Confession Errors?, 36 L. and Hum. Behav. 151, 156 (2012); William Douglas Woody et al., supra
note 142, at 612.
143

144

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1058.

145

Garrett, supra note 45, at 1094.

146

Lego v. Twomy, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), Woody et al., supra note 47, at 19.

Lego, 404 U.S. at 484 (citing Jackson v. Denno case, which established the constitutional
process of suppression hearings to evaluate voluntariness of confession, and stating that their
decision in Jackson was “not based in the slightest on the fear that juries might misjudge the accuracy
of confessions and arrive at erroneous determinations of guilt or innocence”).
147

148

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).

149

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n. 8 (1967).

150

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295.
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decide the case only in light of other evidence.151 The opinion “places great faith
in the ability of a jury to properly evaluate a confession and the evidence about
how it is obtained.”152
A growing body of scholarship demonstrates that jurors do not meet these legal
expectations. Across settings, jurors perceive confessions as powerful evidence.153
In one study, when presented with evidence of an obviously coercive and illegal
interrogation (in which a detective threatens a suspect, displays a weapon in
the interrogation room, and engages in other clearly coercive behavior), jurors
reported that they recognized the coercion and that they rejected the confession.154
However, jurors were more likely to convict the defendant when presented with
the confession induced by coercive interrogation than when there was no
confession presented. Thus, the confession affected jurors’ verdicts even when
they claimed to have rejected it.155 A recent study extended these findings: jurors
who evaluated a high-pressure interrogation rated the tactics as coercive unless
the confession led to corroborating evidence.156 When the confession led to
corroboration, not only were jurors more confident in the suspect’s guilt, those
in the high-pressure condition rated the interrogation as less coercive.157 These
findings have further revealed the complex cognitive difficulties in evaluating
confession evidence. Additionally, studies have demonstrated that jurors do
not reject confessions from a suspect with a mental illness158 or confessions by
a co-conspirator (i.e., after the defendant has refused to confess), even when the
co-conspirator is offered an incentive for his or her secondary confession.159

151

Id. at 295 –96. For a review, see Woody et al., supra note 47.

Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Coerced or Nonvoluntary Confessions, 16 Behav.
Sci. & the L. 423, 437 (1998).
152

153
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experiment
Test of the “Fundamental Difference” Hypothesis, 21 L. and Hum. Behav. 269, 475–76 (1997); Linda
A. Henkel et al, A Survey of People’s Attitudes and Beliefs about False Confessions, 26 Behav. Sci. and
the L. 555, 576 (2008).
154

Kassin & Sukel, supra note 142, at 42.

Id. at 42; see also Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial
Instructions, and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. of Applied Psychol. 489 (1981).
155

156
Netta Shaked-Schroer et al., Overlooking Coerciveness: The Impact of Interrogation Techniques
and Guilt Corroboration on Jurors’ Judgments of Coerciveness, 20 Legal and Criminological Psychol.
68 (2015).
157

Id. at 74.

Linda A. Henkel, Jurors’ Reactions to Recanted Confessions: Do the Defendant’s Personal and
Dispositional Characteristics Play a Role? 14 Psychol., Crime & L. 565, 573–574 (2008).
158

Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses on Jury Decision Making, 32
L. and Hum. Behav. 137, 146 (2008); Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., Secondary Confessions, Expert
Testimony, and Unreliable Testimony, 27 J. Police Crim. Psychol. 179, 188 (2012).
159
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The risks demonstrated by these studies are compounded by several other
findings that further interfere with jurors’ perceptions and trial decisions related
to confession evidence. First, jury-eligible adults do not know much about police
interrogation.160 Second, jurors are likely to accept the myth of psychological
interrogation.161 Third, evaluation of a confession without other corroborating
evidence is extremely difficult, and both police and lay observers struggle to
distinguish between true and false confessions.162 Fourth, even with limited
knowledge of police interrogation, jury-eligible individuals perceive interrogation
tactics as coercive163 but as likely to lead to true rather than false confessions.164
Fifth, jurors may use erroneous assumptions to evaluate confessions. For example,
scholars found that jurors were more likely to convict a defendant in a case
involving a retracted confession if the confession was rich in detail.165 The same
researchers examined twenty documented false confessions and found that “most
are richly detailed statements complete with descriptions of the what, how,
and why the crime was committed;”166 that 85% of false confessions included
reflections on feelings and thoughts during commission of the (non-existent)
crime; and that 65% of false confessions incorporated a minimization theme
(i.e., a face-saving explanation for the crime they did not commit).167 Both true
and false confessions are rich with sensory, emotional, and motivational details,
but mock jurors in this study falsely believed that these details indicate truthful-

160
Iris Blandón-Gitlin et al., “Jurors Believe Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False
Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?” 17 Psychol., Crime, and L.,
239 (2011); Leo & Liu, supra note 51; Saul Kassin, Expert Testimony on the Psychology of
Confessions: A Pyramidal Framework of the Relevant Science, in Beyond Common Sense;
Psychol Sci in the Courtroom 195 –218 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
Despite these findings, some courts assume that jurors do possess this knowledge, see Solomon
M. Fulero, Tales from the Front: Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Interrogations
and Confessions Revisited, Police Interrogation and False Confessions: Current Research,
Practice, and Policy 211–223 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010).
161
Leo, supra note 44; Woody & Forrest, supra note 104, at 349; Woody et al., supra note 47;
Woody et al., supra note 54. See also Blandón-Gitlin, Sperry, & Leo, supra note 160.
162
Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, Behavioral confirmation in the interrogation room: On the
dangers of presuming guilt,” 27 L. and Hum. Behav. 187, at 199; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick,
‘I’d know a false confession if I saw one’: A comparative study of college students and police investigators, 29 L. and Hum. Behav. 211, 221–222.
163

Leo & Liu, supra note 51; Forrest, et al., supra note 51; Woody & Forrest, supra note 104.

164

Leo & Liu, supra note 49; Blandón-Gitlin, Sperry, & Leo, supra note 160.

Appleby et al., found that any admission of guilt generally led to guilty verdicts and that
more detailed confessions led to higher confidence in guilty verdicts. Appleby et al., supra note 109,
at 124.
165

166

Appleby et al., supra note 113, at 116.

Id at 117; confronting suspects with such face-saving themes to justify the criminal behavior
is recommended by those who train interrogators as a central aspect of interrogation methods (see
Inbau et al. supra note 68; Jayne & Buckley, supra note 68), and therefore it is not surprising to see
these themes emerge in false confessions.
167
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ness. Jurors use these and other erroneous biases to evaluate confession evidence
and struggle to recognize, much less reject, false or coerced confessions.168
In addition to these biases, although jurors appear able to recognize police
deception, they fail to discern the effects that deception has on suspects.169 Across
a wide range of measures, jurors do not appear able to meet legal expectations and
do not appear to provide a safety net for suspects who may have faced coercion
and/or confessed falsely.

3. Judges
As expert legal decision makers, judges carry particular responsibilities in
evaluations of confession evidence but may face the same difficulties as jurors.
Studies have found that, similar to jurors, judges recognize the deception inherent
in FEPs, but judges underestimate the coerciveness of these tactics.170 These
findings reflect existing case law regarding police deception about evidence.171
Generally, courts have accepted confessions generated by FEPs and other forms
of deception; even though many of these precedents predate DNA exonerations
of false confessors and systematic study of interrogation and confession,
judges generally apply these earlier precedents.172 In an experimental study, a
majority of sitting judges recognized the coercion in a confession that resulted
from a high-pressure interrogation.173 Much like jurors, however, when other
evidence was weak, judges were more likely to uphold a conviction when a
coerced confession was present, even when they argued that the confession should
not have been admitted to trial.174 Judges view confessions as “such powerful
evidence that they do not discount it when it is legally and logically appropriate
to do so.”175 These cognitive biases remain difficult for human decision makers to
avoid, even legal experts.

168

Id at 124.

Woody & Forrest, supra note 104, at 347; Woody at al., supra note 142, at 612; Woody et
al., supra note 142; for a review see Woody et al., supra note 47.
169

William Douglas Woody et al., Effects of False-Evidence Ploys and Expert Testimony on
Judges’ Perceptions and Trial Decisions, presented at the Am. Psychol.-L. Soc’y Convention,
(March, 2013) (presented at the convention).
170

171

Id.

Id. For relevant court cases, see e.g., Frazier v. Cupp. 394 U.S. 731 (1969); State v. Cobb,
566 P.2d 285 (AZ 1977); People v. Lira, 119 Cal. App. 3d 837 (1981). As discussed subsequently,
there is ongoing judicial review of police interrogation tactics in several jurisdictions.
172

The high pressure condition described a 15-hour coercive interrogation in which the
police interrogator waved a gun and threatened the suspect with the death penalty. Wallace &
Kassin, supra note 143, at 152.
173

174

Wallace & Kassin, supra note 143, at 156.

175

Kassin supra note 44, at 434.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2017

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 17 [2017], No. 2, Art. 2

444	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 17

III. The Sanchez Case and changing expectations for police
The Sanchez case epitomizes the difficulties faced by police in any attempt
to corroborate a confession and, in particular, the difficulties faced by police in
their attempts to identify a false confession.176 In 2009, during a 17-hour
interrogation, Sanchez confessed falsely to a burglary but not to a related
sexual assault; the district attorney then charged Sanchez with both crimes.177
First, Sanchez had some characteristics associated with personal and situational
vulnerability to interrogation and increased potential for false confession.
As noted by the court, Sanchez has a cognitive disability, he struggled to
understand and respond to questions, and, as a situational factor that increased
his vulnerability, he had been awake for more than thirty hours by the end of
the interrogation.178 Investigators observed and noted Sanchez’s atypical behavior
related to his cognitive disability, yet these observations did not reduce their
confidence in his guilt.179 Second, police believed—incorrectly—that they had
the right suspect. Their strong confidence was supported by Sanchez’s confessions
to burglary in ways that appeared to fit the existing evidence and to meet the
corroboration requirements of the trustworthiness standard.180 Police maintained
their confidence in his guilt even though Sanchez “was unable to give any details
regarding his involvement in the crime[s]” and even though he incorporated into
his confession a detail that the officers knew was false.181 In particular, the court
found that Sanchez’s confession to this known falsehood should have informed
police that his confession was false.182 Typical police biases likely shaped their
views of Sanchez’s atypical behavior and their mistaken evaluation of the extensive
exculpatory evidence.
An additional example of corroboration failure in Sanchez involves the
testimony from the survivor of the sexual assault. The survivor described her
assailant as someone who “was roughly forty years old, weighed about 190 pound,
had no tattoos, and had brown hair,” but the prosecution charged a nineteenyear-old who weighed 130 pounds, had prominent tattoos on both arms, and
had short red hair.183 The officers and others knew that the suspect did not fit the

176

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016).

177

Mitchell, supra note 2, ¶ 1, 7.

Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 756; Steven J. Frenda et al., Sleep Deprivation and False Confessions,
113 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 2047, 2048 (2016).
178

179

Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 756.

180

Id. at 753; Mitchell, supra note 2 ¶ 7.

181

Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 757.
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Id.
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Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 756.
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survivor’s description of the perpetrator, but this did not stop prosecutors from
charging Sanchez with this crime.184
Sanchez is not unique. The indicators of guilt (e.g., the suspect’s confession
to multiple crimes, corroboration of at least some details of his confession, and
strong police expectations that the suspect is guilty) are similar to the cases
reviewed in this paper as well as many others cases in which false confessions
led to mistaken convictions. Despite the indicators of guilt in Sanchez, the
exculpatory evidence was extensive. Similarly, police who charged Bloodsworth,
the juvenile in Oakland, the teens in the Central Park Jogger case, Juan Rivera,
and the Norfolk Four, among many others, continued to seek charges despite
extensive exculpatory evidence, including in some cases DNA evidence that
exonerated the defendant.185 Simply stated, the potentially reckless errors made
by the investigators in Sanchez are not atypical for cases involving false confessions
and may even be less shocking than errors in other cases that did not lead to
charges against police.186 The 10th Circuit, however, found that the substantial
evidence of Sanchez’s innocence should have been evident to investigators, and
the court concluded that investigators “either knew that the confession was
untrue or recklessly disregarded that possibility,” and therefore removed the
investigators’ qualified immunity.187
In this case as in others, police officers faced substantial challenges in their
examination of the Sanchez case and their attempts to corroborate his confession.
They appeared to start with a strong belief in the suspect’s guilt, and he confessed
in ways corroborated by their existing evidence.188 They contaminated and
potentially formatted his confessions, and both processes substantially increased
the already considerable difficulties of evaluating Sanchez’s confession accurately.
In particular, the investigators’ apparent confirmation bias appears to have
limited their abilities to evaluate the confession accurately, even in light of the
exculpatory evidence.189 In the thick of the investigation and without the benefit
of hindsight, officers failed to reject Sanchez’s confession and drop charges until
almost three years after his false confession.190
184
Additionally, based on Garrett’s review, the legal protections of a voluntariness hearing and
a jury trial appear unlikely to have protected Sanchez from the consequences of this false confession.
Garrett, supra note 45.

See Garrett, supra note 45 for a thorough review of cases and failures to reject false
confessions despite extensive exculpatory evidence; see also Innocence Project, Kirk Bloodsworth,
supra note 101; Shipler, supra note 73; Juan Rivera, Innocence Project, (last visited Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/juan-rivera/; Wells & Leo, supra note 49.
185

186

E.g., see Martin, supra note 88, ¶ 13, 16; Juan Rivera, supra note 185.
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Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 755.
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The court had an additional cognitive advantage not available to the
investigators—the power of hindsight. The hindsight bias, a powerful bias in
human cognition, predicts that for those who know a particular outcome, the
series of events leading to that outcome appears predictable, and the applications and consequences of this bias have consistently been observed in many
contexts.191 Could hindsight bias apply in this case? From a hindsight perspective,
the court could view all of the evidence related to Sanchez’s confession, charges,
and eventual release as one coherent story192 and could readily connect, for
example, Sanchez’s confession to a false detail to the eventual decision to drop
charges. From the court’s later perspective, knowing the outcome increases
observers’ confidence that the outcome appears highly likely or even inevitable.
From the police perspective, however, in the midst of the investigation, the
evidence surrounding Sanchez may have appeared, incorrectly and potentially
recklessly, strong enough to support charges. These issues relate not only to
the processes of investigation but also to human cognitive biases. This decision
brings powerful consequences for police investigators.
This decision is one of a small but growing body of cases in which police
investigators have faced sanctions for actions related to interrogation. For example,
Jeff Deskovic was 16 years old when he confessed to a brutal murder he did not
commit; he confessed after an hours-long polygraph examination, while sobbing
on the floor in the fetal position.193 The police polygrapher who induced the
false confession by Deskovic subjected Deskovic to a coercive and excessively long
polygraph examination, and he fabricated evidence; the court denied his request
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity,194 and he was found liable
by a jury.195 Similarly, a civil jury found an individual fraud and loss prevention

191
Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: the Effects of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. of Experimental Psychol.: Hum. Perception and Performance 288 (1975);
Scott A. Hawkins & Reid A. Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After The Outcomes
Are Known, 107 Psychol. Bull. 311 (1990); Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian
Willham, The Hindsight Bias: a Meta-Analysis, 48 Organizational Behav. and Hum. Decision
Processes 147 (1991); Rebecca L. Guilbault et al., A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias, 26
Basic and Applied Soc. Psychol. 103 (2004).

Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model
Inside the Juror 84 –115 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
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Juror Decision-Making,

Deskovic et al. v. City of Peekskill, 894 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (SDNY, 2012); Jeff Deskovic,
supra note 49.
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Deskovic, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 455.

Jonathan Bandler, Deskovic Deskovic’s Lie Detector Test Was “An Interrogation,” Expert Testifies,
Iohud, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/2014/10/15/deskovic-federalcivil-trial-wrongful-conviction-putnam-daniel-stephens/17323927/; Jonathan Bandler, Deskovic
Awarded $40M in Wrongful Conviction Case, Iohud, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.lohud.com/story/
news/local/2014/10/23/jeffrey-deskovic-wrongful-conviction-forty-million-verdict/17798527/.
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officer liable for using excessive and coercive deception, including deception that
would have been illegal for police interrogators and that induced a demonstrably
false confession.196 Courts have also rejected immunity for officers who coerced
statements from juveniles and then used those statements in court and for officers
who disregarded suspects’ invocation of Miranda rights.197
Courts are also reconsidering previously accepted police interrogation tactics,
such as some FEPs. Police in New York City falsely told Adrian Thomas that his
infant son would die unless Thomas confessed to causing his son’s injuries; his
son had already died.198 Although the trial court admitted his confession, the
appellate court ruled that this deception was coercive, ordered a new trial for
Thomas, and suppressed his confession from the new trial.199 Similarly, police
falsely informed Paul Aveni that his detailed confession was needed to save the
life of a friend who had already died; an appeals court reversed Aveni’s conviction
and rejected his self-incriminating statements.200 Although officers have not
faced charges or the loss of qualified immunity in these New York appellate
cases, these cases may shift the legal landscape surrounding deception during
police interrogation. Across the United States, other officers beyond those in
Sanchez may soon face limits to qualified immunity, additional exposure to civil
lawsuits, or even criminal charges related to their errors, negligence, or recklessness
in corroboration of confessions.

IV. The Paradox of Rising Expectations for Police
Since Sanchez, police in states in the 10th Circuit now face both higher
expectations and higher stakes for corroboration of confessions. Although the
trustworthiness standard allows admission of confessions to trial even when the
confession differs substantially from the evidence, police may now lose qualified
immunity if they accept confessions that do not clearly fit existing evidence.201 To
196
Robles v. Autozone, Inc., 2008 WL 2811762 (Cal Ct. App. 2008); William Douglas
Woody et al., Deception In Corporate Interviews: Jurors’ Perceptions, Decisions, and Damage Awards,
Am. Psychol.-L. Soc’y Convention (March, 2016) (presented at the convention).

E.g., Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 2010); California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999).
197

198
People v. Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d 629, 8 N.E.3d 308, 311–12 (N.Y. 2014) (describing
how police falsely claimed that only Thomas’s confession could provide the critical information
physicians needed to save Thomas’s son).
199

Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d 629, 8 N.E.3d 308 at 310.

People v. Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228, 232 (N.Y. App. Div., 2012); James C. McKinley Jr.,
Court Weighs Police Role in Coercing Confessions, New York Times, January 24, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/01/15/nyregion/court-weighs-police-role-in-coercing-confessions.html?emc=
eta1&_r=2.
200

Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Evig supra note 1, at 62-63. As noted previously, supra note 82, the
conviction of Karl Fontenot may come under judicial review.
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review the cognitive challenges that cloud these processes, police must manage
their general pro-guilt biases, and they must remain aware of and continue to
question their beliefs in the suspect’s guilt, particularly if police choose to engage
in behavioral deception detection or in confrontational or deceptive interrogation
methods. Human thinking biases, including motivated reasoning and the
tendency to seek confirmation rather than disconfirmation, impede observers’
abilities to evaluate confession evidence. Contamination and formatting, which
are likely unintentional, may occur despite the best efforts of investigators, and
in most cases can only be detected with a complete video-recording, which is
required only in some states.202 Cognitive biases combine with the difficulties
in detecting contamination and formatting, which in turn affect the accuracy
of forensic analyses and evaluations of unrelated evidence. All of these issues
affect prosecution and defense attorneys as well as police investigators, jurors,
judges, and other observers. Additionally, police risks of taking a false confession
and seeking an erroneous conviction are compounded because voluntariness
hearings, jurors and juries, and judges remain unlikely to provide sufficient
safeguards to defendants who confess falsely.
These risks also come with contradictory expectations that police will use
the greater flexibility of the trustworthiness standard to corroborate confessions,
even as Sanchez holds officers to more exacting standards of corroboration. As
the examples in this paper reveal, false confession cases often contain exculpatory
evidence that remains overlooked by police, both prosecution and defense
attorneys, and other investigators. The Sanchez case is tragically typical. How
many police officers in these cases across the United States could face legal
consequences in ongoing or historical false confession cases?
Although some scholars refuse to take a position on the role of police intent
in cases with false confessions,203 this article argues strongly that these errors
generally reflect human thinking biases and related factors rather than intentional police misconduct.204 Of course, human thinking biases can predispose
202
Colorado House Bill 16-1117 would mandate video-recording for severe felonies and
felonies involving sexual assault; it includes a series of exceptions that allow interrogation without
video-recording, including unavailability or failure of recording equipment, leaving both suspects
and police officers without the protections of a video record. H.B. 16-1117, 2016 70th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); see also Joey Bunch, Democrats, Republicans Working Together on
Colorado Police Reforms, The Denver Post, February 11, 2016, http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_29506490/democrats-republicans-working-together-colorado-police-reforms.
203

See e.g., Garret, supra note 43, at 1074.

Although cases exist of police misconduct (see e.g., the crime scene investigator who
planted fabricated evidence that appeared to corroborate a false confession, Nebraska v. Kofoed,
283 Neb 767, 817 N.W.2d, 225 [NE 2012], see also Jean Oritz, CSI Chief Kofoed Convicted of
Evidence Tampering, Lincoln Journal Star, March 23, 2010, http://journalstar.com/news/stateand-regional/nebraska/csi-chief-kofoed-convicted-of-evidence-tampering/article_8cd5cb4c-368c11df-8531-001cc4c03286.html), the body of scientific literature as reviewed previously suggests
that intentional misconduct is not necessary for errors involving confession evidence to lead to
miscarriages of justice; see also claims supra note 98.
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officers to recklessness as well as negligence, and future juries and courts
appear likely to face the challenge of unraveling these distinctions. The 10th
Circuit in Sanchez moved responsibility for these errors to individual police
officers, who are now required to recognize the lack of fit between confessions
and the evidence, despite the cognitive barriers to this recognition.205 Are
we requiring police to meet standards that remain elusive for any human
decision maker, particularly decision makers without the benefit of hindsight?
Individual officers must navigate this storm. What changes can support police
in these complex, high-stakes situations with these conflicting requirements
that simultaneously lower the bar for corroboration while increasing risk for
individual officers?

V. Recommendations
A. Continuing education
The growing scientific literature suggests several practical recommendations
related to continuing education regarding corroboration of confession evidence.
First and foremost, education and training for police, forensic investigators,
judges, district attorneys, and defense attorneys can improve knowledge about
the existence, causes, and consequences of false confessions, the dangers of
deception and coercion during interrogations, and the substantial likelihood of
contamination, formatting, confirmation biases, and other errors of corroboration.
Acknowledging that false confessions exist is a critical first step; even some
organizations that have disputed the scientific evidence about false confessions
now admit that false confessions exist and that police investigators should be
aware of and take steps to reduce these risks.206 Specifically, the growing scientific
literature suggests that particular care should be taken with children, suspects
with mental illnesses, and suspects with cognitive disabilities (e.g., Sanchez),
particularly now that police may risk their qualified immunity in part for failure
to recognize these issues.207
In particular, additional education for police, investigators, prosecution and
defense attorneys, and judges should incorporate the growing scientific findings
about the risks and consequences of police deception. As discussed previously, in

205

Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 757 (10th Cir. 2016).

John E. Reid, False Confessions, Investigator Tip, January-February, 2015, http://campaign.
r20.constantcontact.com/render?ca=0004d1a7-c508-4bbb-90ca-4308d7f90d63&c=1ca3c4e04cf9-11e4-9cfc-d4ae528eb27b&ch=1ca831b0-4cf9-11e4-9cfc-d4ae528eb27b.
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Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016); Mitchell, supra note 2. Those who train
interrogators also recommend caution when interrogating children because “It is well accepted that
juvenile suspects are more susceptible to falsely confess than adult suspects,” John E. Reid, Research
Reveals Insight on Juvenile Interrogations and Confessions, Investigator Tip, March-April, 2014,
http://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_tips.html?serial=20140301.
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archival investigations as well as experimental research, deception is associated
with false confession.208 The largest disputes surround deception about evidence.209
There is growing awareness of these concerns from those who train interrogators,
who now recommend additional caution with FEPs.210 Additionally, as discussed
previously, at least some courts are reconsidering the limits of acceptable
interrogations tactics, including deception.211
A larger goal is for police, prosecutors, and judges to remain aware of the effects
of human cognitive biases on evaluations of confession evidence, particularly
human tendencies to seek confirmation rather than disconfirmation. The findings
from the scientific literature suggest that adherence to the trustworthiness
standard sets a low bar for corroboration of confession evidence. The risks and
potential costs of errors can be tremendous; confession evidence carries too much
power to be taken lightly.212

B. Courts and the corpus delicti rule
Many of the long term consequences of LaRosa remain unknown in
Colorado. As discussed previously, any estimate of the number of cases affected by
changes in these standards is likely to be fraught with difficulties; prosecutors may
decline to prosecute if they perceive difficulties in meeting the requirements of the
corpus delicti rule or, presumably, the trustworthiness standard.213 Additionally,
observers do not know the degree to which this ruling has affected decisions
of defense and prosecution attorneys regarding plea bargains, which often rest
at least in part on each side’s expectations about court outcomes. If district
attorneys now feel increased confidence in their ability to meet the Colorado
corroboration standard for extra-judicial confessions, we may see an increase
in disputed confession cases at trial and in appellate courts. In particular,
prosecutors may express increased confidence that they will succeed at trial and
at securing effective plea bargains, not simply due to the increased flexibility
of the trustworthiness standard but also due to misplaced confidence in
corroboration that could be distorted by confession evidence in ways discussed

208
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209
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Tip, May-June, 2012, http://reid.com/educational_info/r_tips.html?serial=20120501&print=
[print].
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previously. These decisions would also bring a commensurate increase in risk for
police officers.
How have other states handled these questions? State courts have provided
a diverse range of opinions regarding arguments in LaRosa and corroboration of
confessions. With the decision in LaRosa, Colorado has joined at least 11 other
states across the nation in moving from corpus delicti rule to the trustworthiness
standard.214 Some states, however, have considered the strengths and weaknesses
of the corpus delicti rule and refused to move to the trustworthiness standard. For
example, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed LaRosa as well as related cases
and decided to retain the corpus delicti rule.215 In Texas, an appellate court noted the
Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning in LaRosa, but decided to retain the corpus
delicti rule.216 As a third option, some states, including Tennessee, New Jersey, and
New Mexico, have moved to a modified trustworthiness standard that preserves
some elements of the corpus delicti rule.217 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
reviewed arguments in LaRosa and promoted the modified trustworthiness
standard that includes, in cases with “tangible injury,” a requirement that the
state present independent evidence to support the trustworthiness of the
defendant’s statements and “independent prima facie evidence that the injury
actually occurred.”218 Across jurisdictions, courts have provided several distinct
legal analyses of corroboration requirements.219 Although the concerns raised
by the Colorado Supreme Court in LaRosa have inspired some courts, others
have remained unmoved or reaffirmed their commitment to the corpus delicti
rule.220 Should the Colorado Supreme Court or other courts in the 10th Circuit
jurisdiction revisit this issue, many options exist for revision.

C. Forensic analyses
States should adopt revised forensic testing protocols to ensure that
forensic examiners are blind to the identities of the suspects and/or confessors.
State of Tennessee v. Bishop, 431 S.W. 3d 22 (Tenn. 2014); see also Utah, State v. Mauchley,
67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Evig, supra note
1, at 63 n. 57.
214
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State of Tennessee v. Bishop, 431 S.W. 3d 22; State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 859 A.2d
1173 (N.J. 2004); State of New Mexico v. Wilson, 149 NM 273, 2011-NMSC-001, 248 P.3d 315
(NM 2010).
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Allen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 752 S.E. 2d 856 at 859; State v. Reddish, 181 N.J.
553, 859 A.2d 1173 (N.J. 2004); State of New Mexico v. Wilson, 149 NM 273, 2011-NMSC-001,
248 P.3d 315 (NM 2010); Carrizales v. Texas, 414 S.W. 3d 737 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013).
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As the recent report about FBI biases has demonstrated, forensic analysts often
bring biased evaluations of evidence to trial.221 Perhaps more importantly,
rather than random error or evenly distributed biases (i.e., in favor of both the
prosecution and the defense), forensic analysts, likely unintentionally, have
systematically distorted their hair analyses overwhelmingly in favor of the
prosecution.222 These biases are preventable. Blind testing protocols, in which
the evaluator does not know the origin or identities of the samples, are standard
across scientific disciplines.223 They emerged because scientists, as motivated
reasoners who want to be right, struggle to separate their own motives from
their analyses.224 Many have proposed these reforms for forensic evaluations.225
In several jurisdictions these reforms are already in place for eyewitness identification procedures, and blind eyewitness lineup administrators are specified
in legislation signed into Colorado law in April 2015.226 In addition to these
scientific and legal reasons to utilize blind testing procedures, these procedures
would allow prosecutors, police investigators, and forensic analysts to refute at
trial any allegations of biased forensic procedures.227 These ongoing biases,
however, persist and confound the difficulties involved in corroboration of
confession evidence.
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Cates et al., supra note 125.

222

Id. ¶ 3.

223

Barry H. Kantowitz et al, Experimental Psychology (10th ed.).

Examples of motivated reasoning abound across scientific disciplines. The present author
is most familiar with these errors across the history of psychology. Some of the most egregious
examples of historical motivated reasoning in science came from the early days of intelligence
testing; simply stated, White researchers saw evidence of White superiority, even when such evidence
did not exist or was contradicted by researchers’ own findings. See Gould, Mismeasure of Man;
Defining Difference: Race and Racism in the History of Psychology (Andrew S. Winston ed.,
1981); William Douglas Woody et al., A Brief History of the Psychology of Prejudice, In
Psychol. Specialties in Hist. Context: Enriching the Classroom Experience for Teachers and
Students, 302 –323 (William Douglas Woody et al. eds. 2016).
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For example, see the American Statistical Association, ASA Board Policy Statement on
Forensic Science Reform (April 17, 2010).
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S.B. 15-058 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015); see also Brandon L. Garrett,
Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 267 (2011). Requiring
blind investigators has long been recognized as a critical reform of eyewitness identification
procedures. See e.g., Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photo Spreads,” 22 L. & Hum. Beh. 603, 627 (1998).

For example, a forensic analyst under cross examination by a defense attorney could
acknowledge typical practice of nonblind testing and the high prevalence of bias in forensic
examinations but then present the modified, blind testing protocols that eliminate the potential of
bias. The use of blind testing protocols to identify a defendant may increase jurors’ confidence in
the defendant’s guilt and may improve the public’s perceptions of the fairness of the criminal justice
system, although no known experimental research has yet evaluated these questions.
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D. Mandatory video-recording
Legislative mandates to video-record all interrogations in their entirety can
provide several important protections to suspects, police officers, attorneys,
and courts.228 A complete video-recording can verify an officer’s testimony and
increase his or her credibility, and it can also demonstrate that the officer used
accurate and thorough methods for collecting evidence in the interrogation
room and that the officer is committed to preservation of the evidence in “its
most unbiased and unadulterated form.”229 Importantly, a video-recording
can protect police investigators from spurious claims of coercion during
interrogation and allow police supervisors to evaluate performance of officers
and to improve training procedures.230
Video-recordings also benefit trial attorneys. Even if the video-recordings do
not show materials that facilitate a victory for the prosecution, the recordings
can help prosecutors prepare for potential suppression hearings, trials, or plea
bargains.231 Additionally, a video-recording, unlike an officer’s handwritten notes,
can allow a complete review of interrogation tactics, including potential deception
in general as well as potential FEPs,232 can enable defense attorneys to prepare for
suppression hearings, trial, or plea bargains, and may reveal suspect vulnerabilities
or interrogation tactics that provide justification for introducing an expert
witness.233 A lesser-known benefit for defense attorneys is what the FBI authors
called “‘client control,’ cutting through [potential] inconsistencies told to the
representing attorneys about what actually occurred” during the interrogation.234
Video-recordings also benefit individual suspects and defendants, the public
at large, and the criminal justice system as a whole. The most obvious benefits
to individual suspects and defendants include potential evidence of coercion or
involuntary confession, evidence of contamination and formatting that would
228
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Police Deception and Confession Evidence: A Reply to Wallace and Kellerman 22 The Jury Expert 26
(2010).
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Am. Acad. of Psychiatry & the L. 174 (2010); Solomon M. Fulero, Tales from the Front:
Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions Revisited, Police
Interrogation & False Confessions: Current Research, Prac., and Pol’y 211–223 (G. Daniel
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010).
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otherwise be unavailable, and evidence of deception.235 Additionally, experts
who testify about the psychology of interrogation and confession often rely on
video-recordings to evaluate the interrogation and confession, and the testimony
of experts affects jurors’ perceptions, jurors’ individual decisions, the decisions
of deliberating juries, and the decisions of trial judges.236 The larger public also
benefits from video-recordings of interrogations in their entirety. Not only does
transparency in general benefit law enforcement, but complete video-recordings
demonstrate to the public that police are taking transparent steps to engage in
responsible investigations.237 These general benefits for the public and the criminal
justice system may be particularly important in the current climate of police and
community relations.
Despite the enthusiasm of many advocates of interrogations for videorecording,238 this method is not sufficient to protect suspects and police officers.
As a recent review demonstrated, twenty-two of thirty-eight documented false
confessions were video-recorded, and the recordings did not prevent miscarriages
of justice.239 For video-recordings to prevent miscarriages of justice, recordings
need to be used in combination with other procedures. Alongside video-recording
mandates must come additional training for police about the recognition of
vulnerable suspects and the interrogation of these suspects. Other reforms are
also necessary, including careful consideration of interrogation tactics and, to the
degree possible through blind forensic testing and other reforms, reduction of
investigatory biases in general and confirmation biases in particular. Additionally,
video-recordings are required for evaluation of voluntariness and for any proposed
hearing related to reliability of confession evidence, as discussed subsequently.

E. Legal changes
Several legal factors make inclusion of coerced or false confession evidence
more likely at trial, and legislation can address many of these factors. First,
higher standards of proof in voluntariness hearings could reduce the likelihood of
admission of false confessions to trial along with resultant mistaken convictions.240
Second, reliability hearings rather than voluntariness hearings could reshape
evaluations of confession evidence in Colorado and across the 10th Circuit. As
235

Garrett, supra note 45; Kassin et al., supra note 8.
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Research, Practice, and Policy 143 –160 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010);
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noted previously, Miranda provides only limited protection, and suppression
hearings focus almost exclusively on voluntariness. Additionally, the low standard
of proof leads to the high likelihood of confessions being admitted to trial,
where jurors and judges provide only limited protections for defendants. Some
have called for reliability hearings in addition to a separate voluntariness hearing
to evaluate disputed confession evidence241 and for the use of the Ofshe-Leo
Test described previously to evaluate the reliability of disputed confessions.242
More recently, scholars have proposed a series of specific procedures, including
model statutory language.243 From their model language, they argue that it would
be “the rare case—perhaps a case built exclusively on a confession, with little
or no corroboration, and evidence of errors and contamination—that will lead
a trial court to exclude a confession.”244 Any evaluation of reliability rests on
the existence of a complete video-recording;245 therefore, reliability hearings, as
well as any review of corroboration and potential contamination, must function
concurrently with a requirement for video-recording complete interrogations.

VI. Conclusions
Recent changes in Colorado law, in particular the move from the corpus
delicti rule to the trustworthiness standard and the removal of qualified
immunity from police officers who accepted a confession that did not fit the
evidence, have raised the stakes for the ways that officers evaluate confession
evidence. These changes interact with other difficulties related to confession
evidence, particularly the issues of contamination and formatting as well as
the ways that confession evidence impacts forensic investigations and legal
decisions. The scientific evidence consistently demonstrates that the biggest
challenge to the accurate corroboration of a confession is the existence of confes
sion itself. A confession affects observers, their perceptions of the suspect, and
their perceptions of the other evidence. As one prominent scholar argued, “false
confessions, once taken, arouse a strong inference of guilt, thereby unleashing a
chain of confirmation biases that make the consequences difficult to overcome
despite innocence.”246 These concerns justify consideration of important changes
in Colorado law as well as states across the 10th Circuit, including continuing
education, mandatory videotaping, a more rigorous standard of proof for
voluntariness hearings, and optional reliability hearings in cases with disputed
confessions. Our quest for corroboration should go beyond the legal minimum,
and we must move to protect both suspects and law enforcement personnel.
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